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This paper employs quantitative analysis to explore the issue of cultural barriers 
to accessing highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) in developing 
countries. It begins with an econometric analysis of potential socio-economic 
determinants of HAART coverage, i.e. the number of people on HAART as a 
percentage of the total number needing it. The analysis suggests that language 
fractionalisation (a widely used indicator of cultural diversity) acts as a barrier to 
HAART coverage, whereas ethnic fractionalisation is not significant, although 
politically salient ethnic divisions may be. The most important drivers of 
HAART coverage are: region (notably, living in the hyper-epidemic region of 
the Southern part of the African continent); and access to donor funding.  
 
The effect of ‘region’ may, of course, be proxying for unmeasured ‘cultural’ 
variation that is not being picked up by the language and ethnic diversity 
variables. But it may also be picking up other imperfectly measured variables 
such as level of economic development and institutional strength or even 
unmeasured factors such as different variants of HIV. One thus cannot conclude 
from the fact that regional differences exist, that these have roots in cultural 
differences.   
 
The question of ‘cultural barriers’ to HAART is usually interrogated at a 
domestic or local level where understandings of disease aetiology and healing, 
stigma, conceptions of masculinity etc can be explored (e.g. Ashforth, 2005; 
Nattrass 2005; Ashforth and Nattrass, 2005; Nattrass, 2008a; Steinberg, 2008). 
Similarly, country-level research can help shed light on how political factors, 
such as government leadership on AIDS and civil society mobilisation in favour 
of HAART, also affect the pace and level of HAART coverage (e.g. Nattrass, 
2007; Robbins, 2009). Political factors are crucial in shaping access to HAART 
(Bor, 2007; de Waal, 2006; Iliffe, 2006; Nattrass, 2008b) but these are not 
immutable and can be transformed rapidly through domestic and international 
pressure. The same is true of cultural understandings of HIV and HAART which 
can change quickly in the presence of civil society mobilisation and in response 




This paper, by virtue of its focus on cross-country differences in HAART 
coverage, does not address the kinds of cultural and political obstacles that are 
more appropriately addressed through ethnographic research. However, the 
analysis highlights a potentially important over-arching cultural issue which is 
easily missed by country-level analysis – namely the role of donor attitudes and 
beliefs in shaping access to HAART.  Donor funding is typically seen as an 
economic issue. But to understand it merely as a resource flow is to miss the 
importance of ‘donor culture’ in shaping and sustaining that resource flow.  
 
Global funding for AIDS rose from $1.6 billion in 2001 to $10 billion in 2007 
and $13.7 billion in 2009 (UNAIDS, 2008: 188; Sidibé, 2009: 4). Foreign aid 
through bilateral initiatives, especially the US President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and multilateral initiatives such as the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, were crucial in driving HIV prevention and 
treatment efforts – contributing almost half of total resources for AIDS (the rest 
being made up primarily of government resources and private contributions). 
This unprecedented international effort, which resulted in the number of people 
on HAART in developing and transitional countries rising from a few hundred 
in the early 2000s to over 4 million in 2009 (Sidibé, 2009), was underpinned by 
a sea-change in donor attitudes. Up until 2002/3 the prevailing view in donor 
circles was that HAART was ‘too expensive’ and impossible to administer in 
developing countries. This orthodoxy was overturned in a remarkably rapid time 
by civil society mobilisation, the development of generic antiretrovirals (which 
lowered costs significantly), and by more sophisticated understandings of the 
benefits of rolling out HAART, both in terms of lives saved, health costs averted 
and promoting development (e.g. CMH, 2001).  
 
Given the massive flow of international funding for AIDS, it is unsurprising that 
the cross-country analysis found donor support to be a key determinant of 
HAART coverage. Yet the very donor culture which made the international 
HAART rollout possible, is in the process of changing – largely because of the 
emerging backlash against AIDS funding. In this regard, donor culture is in 
danger of becoming an important cultural obstacle to HAART coverage, albeit 
and external one.  
 
The second part of the paper sketches out the key arguments of the backlash, 
paying particular attention to the claim that ‘too much’ is spent on HIV and that 
Africans themselves agree. This assertion about what Africans believe is 
challenged, once again by employing quantitative analysis, by looking at 
opinion poll data in Africa. The analysis suggests that high levels of support 
exist within Africa for continued spending on AIDS, even in the presence of 
other challenges.   
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Cultural and other determinants of Cross-
country HAART Coverage 
 
As of December 2006, about a third of those needing HAART were estimated to 
be receiving it, although as can be seen in Figure 1, HAART coverage varied 
significantly across country. Why is this? What factors made it more or less 
likely that citizens would be able to access to HAART? Cross country regression 
analysis can help explore the issue by accounting for the extent to which 
demographic, institutional and other factors ‘explain’ HAART coverage (see 








The key economic factor constraining governments in their attempt to rollout 
HAART is per capita income, i.e. the overall level of economic development. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, there is a positive (but weak) relationship between 
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regression line are doing better in terms of HAART coverage than would be 
expected if per capita income was the only factor driving HAART coverage 
(and vice versa for those below the line). The recognized poor performers (e.g. 
Russia, Ukraine and South Africa) fall substantially below the line (suggesting 
that they should have achieved higher levels of coverage given their level of 
development), and the poster children for good performance (Cambodia, Cuba, 
Brazil, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Thailand, Uganda) fall substantially above it.  
Even after controlling for other relevant epidemiological and institutional 
constraints, these countries retain their outlier status, thereby indicating the 
importance of political leadership and other country-level factors in driving 
HAART coverage (Nattrass, 2008b).    
 
This section of the paper explores the extent to which HAART coverage can be 
‘explained’ by cultural factors, such as ethnic and language fractionalization, 
controlling for other relevant factors. The empirical strategy is to control for the 
epidemiological challenges facing the countries, the economic resources 
available, the reach of the health sector, and institutional capacity – and then see 
if these broad cultural indicators matter and to what extent. A recent analysis by 
Lieberman (2009) argues that race and ethnicity matter profoundly with regard 
to AIDS policy. His over-arching theoretical hypothesis is that in the presence of 
politically salient ethnic boundaries, governments are less aggressive on AIDS 
policy because HIV prevalence may be concentrated amongst politically 
marginalised groups and/or because the ruling elite may not wish to draw 
attention to the presence of an HIV epidemic amongst its own supporters. His 
empirical analysis suggests that the sharper the ethnic boundaries, the worse 
countries perform on AIDS policy, including the HAART rollout.  
 
A common measure of cultural diversity in cross-country analysis is ‘ethnic 
fractionalisation’ which measures the probability of two randomly selected 
members of a population belong to different ethnic groups. The simple linear 
regression model 1 presented in Table 1 of ethnic fractionalization on the (log 
of) HAART coverage in 77 developing countries,1 suggests that a negative 
                                                 
1 Angola, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Russia, Senegal, South African Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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relationship exists, i.e. that the greater the degree of ethnic diversity, the lower 
the level of HAART coverage:  
 
 
Table 1. Preliminary Regression Models on (Log of) HAART Coverage  
 
Log HAART coverage (std) Model 1 
Coefficient 
(Robust std error) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(Robust std error) 




Language Fractionalisation (std)  -0.4933*** 
(0.0924) 
R-squared 0.0339 0.1744 
Prob>F 0.0475 0.0000 
Number of observations 77 77 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level 




As the above variables are both standardized, the regression tells us that a one 
standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization is associated with  a 0.184 
standard deviation decrease in predicted log HAART coverage (and that this is 
statistically significant at the 5% level). However, as Model 2 shows, adding 
language fractionalization (the probability of two randomly selected people 
speaking different languages) renders ethnic fractionalization statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that it is language diversity rather than ethnic 
diversity per se which is important for HAART coverage – perhaps because it 
makes communication about AIDS treatment that much more complex for 
policy makers and health practitioners. The regression model predicts that 
controlling for ethnic fractionalization, a one standard deviation increase in 
language fractionalization leads to a 0.493 standard deviation decrease in the log 
of HAART coverage (and that the estimate is statistically significant at the one 
percent level).  
 
The extent to which countries are able to rollout HAART obviously depends on 
other factors which also need to be included in the model. The regressions in 
Table 2 include population size, the number of HIV positive people and the 
percentage of HIV positive people in urban areas (to account for the fact that it 
is easier to rollout HAART to concentrated urban populations). The regressions 
also control for resource availability by including per capita income, the share 




country is a PEPFAR focus country or was a recipient of a (first round) Global 
Fund grant.  
 
 
Table 2. Regression Models on (Log of) HAART Coverage  
 
Log HAART coverage (std) Model 3 
Coefficient 
(Robust std error) 
Model 4 
Coefficient 
(Robust std error) 
Ethnic Fractionalisation (std) -0.1110 
(0.1198) 
 





















































R-squared 0.6225 0.6907 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations 77 67 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level 
Ethnic and Language fractionalization from Allesina; Government effectiveness from Kaufman, both 
available from http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm. Other data from data available on 





HIV is, of course, not the only health challenge facing developing countries. 
Countries with a heavy burden of other diseases should not be expected to have 
as great a HAART rollout as countries with fewer competing health challenges. 
In order to account for this, the number of disability adjusted life years (DALYs) 
lost due to non-AIDS-related reasons were included as a proxy for non AIDS-
related demands on the health budget. As state capacity to deliver health 
services is also important, the percentage of women giving birth in the presence 
of skilled health professionals is included as an indicator of the capacity and 
reach of the health sector. Kaufman’s index of government effectiveness was 
also added to control for overall government capacity. Finally, the models in 
Table 2 control for being in the hyper-epidemic region of the broadly Southern 
part of the African continent (South Africa, Swaziland, Namibia, Lesotho, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Madagascar, Malawi, Zambia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Tanzania and Angola) which have been had to cope with a long-running 
epidemic, with multiple clades of HIV infection and a shared history of trade 
and migration (Iliffe, 2006). 
 
The regressions in Table 2 show that language fractionalization remains 
statistically and substantive significant after controlling for these other variables. 
However, other variables, notably being in the Southern part of Africa, having a 
large population, many HIV positive people and being a PEPFAR focus country 
have larger effects on predicted HAART coverage. Other statistically significant 
variables in both models 3 and 4 include the proportion of HIV positive people 
in urban areas and the proportion of government spending on health. Note that 
per capita income is not a significant determinant of HAART coverage once 
other variables are controlled for, and neither were either of the proxies for state 
capacity. This highlights once again the importance of donor funding in driving 
the HAART rollout.  
 
Model 4 uses Lieberman’s ‘ethnic boundary index’ instead of ethnic 
fractionalisation because this measure is sensitive to his assessment of the level 
of institutionalization of ethnic boundaries rather than variations in demographic 
diversity per se. As can be seen in Table 2, this variable, in contrast to ethnic 
fractionalisation, is statistically significant. However, its size impact is relatively 
small (it ranks six out of nine of the statistically significant variables in terms of 
the size of its impact on HAART coverage). Note also that Lieberman’s measure 
is not available for all the countries in the sample (no measure is provided for 
Iran, Barbados, Belize, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Latvia, Russia 
and Suriname) – hence the number of observations falls when his variable is 
included. The other variables retain their importance (and the proxy for health 
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sector capacity, i.e. percentage of births attended by a skilled professional) 
becomes significant in this regression. 
 
The above empirical analysis is, of course, far from exhaustive. Although the 
variables included in models 3 and 4 ‘explain’ about two-thirds of the total 
variation in cross-country HAART coverage, there are clearly factors that have 
not been accounted for. While the attempt to measure the impact of culture is 
suggestive only (and very incomplete) we can be reasonably confident of the 
regression result that domestic government spending on health and donor 
support (especially PEPFAR) are crucial factors driving the HAART rollout.  
This brings us to the second part of the paper, namely donor culture and the 
current backlash against AIDS funding which appears to be changing donor 
attitudes and may well undermine the HAART rollout in the future.  
 
 
Donor and African priorities for AIDS Funding 
 
The HAART rollout over the past half decade has involved an unprecedented 
increase in donor support for health interventions, particularly AIDS. Initially 
motivated by concerns that AIDS would undermine development and even 
threaten global security (CMH, 2001), the AIDS response became increasingly 
shaped by solidaristic internationalist ideals. Most notably, the Global Fund for 
AIDS, TB and Malaria broke with the old aid paradigm that insisted aid flows 
be ‘sustainable’ (i.e. in line with what developing country governments could 
afford to assume responsibility for in the near future) by allocating resources in 
line with need (Ooms, 2008). Similarly, the World Health Organisation and 
UNAIDS successfully drove an international agenda for ‘universal access’ to 
HAART – a truly bold and innovative project, unprecedented in scale, scope and 
long-term resource commitments from rich to poor countries (Lieberman, 2009). 
Both UNAIDS and the Global Fund transformed development practice further 
by involving NGOs, civil society and patient stake-holder groups in decision-
making at all levels – most notably through the country co-ordinating 
mechanisms through which Global Fund grants are channelled (UNAIDS, 2008; 
Global Fund, 2009).  
 
In short, what we have witnessed is an important change in global development 
discourse and practice; or to put it differently, an important donor cultural shift 
which has forged new forms of global solidarity, involving and empowering a 
wider set of players. Yet this new culture is fragile and under threat. A counter-
hegemonic discourse is on the rise which is threatening to undermine, and in 
important respects already has, the global AIDS response (Nattrass and 
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Gonsalves, 2009). This ‘backlash’ against AIDS-related funding claims that too 
many resources have been allocated to AIDS programs, particularly HAART 
(see e.g. Garrett, 2007, England 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Proponents claim that 
health systems have been harmed, money wasted and that Africans themselves 
believe that AIDS resources should have gone to other development initiatives 
(e.g. Easterly, 2006: 258).  
 
These claims are severely over-blown (Nattrass and Gonsalves, 2009) but 
nevertheless appear to be hardening into stylised facts in donor circles – notably 
the International Health Partnership of 16 countries which channels resources 
for health to developing countries. Donors are increasingly arguing for the need 
to put resources into ‘sector-wide approaches’ and to reallocate foreign aid to 
the other millennium development goals. Although international experience has 
shown that the AIDS response can and has in many cases strengthened 
developing country health systems (e.g. Yu et al, 2008; El-Sadr and Abrams, 
2007; Global Fund, 2009; Nattrass and Gonsalves, 2009) and that the 
relationship between AIDS funding and health sector impact is complex and 
varies across country (WHO MPSCG, 2009), the simplistic backlash against 
AIDS funding has not abated in donor circles. Indeed, the backlash is an 
emerging cultural obstacle which needs to be taken into account when thinking 
about the HAART rollout in developing countries.  
 
One of the key questions is whether this external attitudinal shift meshes with 
opinion ‘on the ground’, particularly in Africa where the epidemic is 
concentrated. Does the backlash reflect real African priorities, or is it, once 
again, another donor vision imposed on recipients? 
 
The 2005 Afrobarometer survey of 18 African countries asked respondents what 
they considered to be the three most important problems facing the country. 
Table 3 shows that most people cited poverty and income-related issues, with 
health/sickness/AIDS typically coming in third (in the total sample, 
poverty/famine was mentioned 18% of the time, unemployment/income 17% 
followed by health/sickness/AIDS 12% of the time). This tells us is that 
Africans worry primarily about income and food security, especially in low-
income and high-unemployment situations. It does not tell us anything about 
their preferences for government or donor spending. To conclude that, one 
would need responses to a different set of questions which would probe, in 
addition to the scale of the problem, the relative efficacy of different 





“Question 66:  Which of these statements is closest to your view?   
• A: The government should devote many more resources to combating 
AIDS, even if this means that less money is spent on things like 
education. 
• B: There are many other problems facing this country beside AIDS; even 
if people are dying in large numbers, the government needs to keep its 




Figure 2. Responses to the Afrobarometer Survey (2005) to Question 66. 
 
 
The results, depicted in Figure 2, show that most countries favoured option A 
(government should allocate more resources for AIDS), but that in Botswana, 
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, more 
than 50% of respondents agreed with option B (more resources for other 
problems). Note that this does not mean that respondents in these countries 
would prefer resources currently allocated to AIDS to be removed and 
reallocated to other projects. That was not the question posed. Respondents were 
asked whether they would like many more resources to be devoted to AIDS (and 
at the cost of other programs) or if they think that the government should focus 
on the many other problems besides AIDS (even in the face of high mortality). 
This is a difficult choice and it is unsurprising that 8% of respondents overall 
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Those who did respond with a choice were effectively primed to take at least 
two factors into account: the scale/urgency of the ‘other problems’ facing the 
country (famine would obviously trump AIDS as it has a more immediate 
impact on survival) and the pressure on the government budget. As all the 
countries in the sample (with the exception of Lesotho and Cape Verde) were by 
2005 already receiving high profile support for AIDS projects from either or 
both of the Global Fund and PEPFAR, it is possible (and likely) that respondents 
took this into account when thinking about whether their government should 
allocate more money to AIDS. If so, then respondents could have selected 
option B on the grounds that donors were looking after the AIDS response. In 
other words, support for Option B in the context of serious other problems and 
donor support for AIDS should not be interpreted crudely as support for the 
backlash claims that poor people think that ‘too much money’ in total has been 
or is being spent on AIDS.   
 
Consider the case of Botswana, which, through the assistance of donors, notably 
PEPFAR, was by 2005 well on the way to achieving universal HAART 
coverage. This, coupled with persistently high levels of poverty and 
unemployment (see Table 3), would make it rational and understandable for 
respondents to direct the government to focus on other problems in the future – 
notably those related to poverty and unemployment. Indeed, what is, in fact, 
striking about the Botswana opinion data is that over a third of respondents 
actually selected Option A: i.e. that government should continue to allocate 
substantial resources to AIDS even at the cost of other programs. This probably 
speaks to the terrible toll the epidemic has had on the country (which has seen 
life expectancy decline by 31 years between 1982 and 2002 in that country).  
 
The scale of ‘other problems’ is also obviously crucial in affecting the choice of 
option A or option B. Thus in Zimbabwe, where by 2005 the country was 
already in macroeconomic melt-down with high and rising unemployment, 
inflation and poverty, it is surprising that anyone prioritised AIDS. Yet even in 
the face of such a disastrous situation, where macroeconomic management, 
poverty and unemployment dominated the perceived problems facing the 
government, health/sickness/AIDS still figured in 15% of answers, and 30% of 
respondents selected option A (with more than half of these respondents 
reporting a strong preference). Again, this probably speaks to the human toll that 
AIDS has exacted on Zimbabwe – and to the strong desire of Zimbabweans to 





Table 3: Most Important Problems Facing Governments (Afrobarometer 2005) 
 
Country GDP per 
capita, HIV 
prevalence (2005), 
total AIDS spending 
per HIV positive 
person (2007) 


































Benin $1,130   





15.3% 10.0% 5.3% 10.4% 10.7% 49.1% 
Botswana $12,154  





16.4% 7.8% 1.6% 3.0% 8.9% 61.5% 
Cape Verde $5,831  





9.9% 6.3% 1.4% 3.8% 6.6% 21.5% 
Ghana $2,480  





10.6% 8.3% 5.6% 8.9% 15.3% 54.9% 






11.4% 7.8% 5.9% 6.7% 8.7% 58.5% 
Lesotho $3,384  





6.9% 9.8% 0.8% 8.4% 3.5% 47.0% 
Madagascar $924   





10.1% 4.0% 6.3% 10.7% 5.6% 56.6% 
Malawi $669 





7.5% 9.6% 3.2% 4.4% 6.2% 56.6% 
Mali $1,034  
HIV: 1.7%, $270 
36.4%  
(30%  urban) 
6.4% 
(15%  urban) 
12.0% 9.8% 1.1% 4.8% 6.6% 40.0% 
Mozambique $1,034  





17.2% 9.5% 2.1% 4.3% 10.6% 33.6% 
Namibia $7,634  





11.9% 5.7% 2.5% 2.2% 11.6% 53.7% 
Nigeria $1,095  





4.9% 3.7% 6.2% 4.5% 7.3% 42.3% 
Senegal $1,780,  





18.0% 4.7% 3.8% 4.4% 7.9% 41.2% 
South Africa $11,187  





13.0% 6.1% 1.9% 5.4% 4.3% 38.0% 
Tanzania $707 





16.7% 10.0% 2.8% 12.2% 9.5% 30.4% 
Uganda $1,454 





15.5% 10.3% 2.7% 5.8% 11.2% 48.5% 
Zambia $1,023,  





9.7% 8.2% 2.4% 6.2% 12.8% 52.3% 
Zimbabwe $2,065  





7.4% 2.5% 15.2% 0.6% 2.5% 63.4% 
Source: Afrobarometer (2005). Available on http://www.afrobarometer.org/data.html; data on 
spending per HIV positive person (2007) from UNAIDS (www.unaids.org) 
*CIA Factbook (2005): http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2005/ 
 
 
The highest level of support for Option B was in Malawi, a country plagued by 
poverty, famine and unsafe water supplies (Dionne et al, 2009). This was 
reflected in the Afrobarometer finding that poverty and famine was the 
overwhelmingly largest concern (30%), followed by water supply (10%) and 
health/sickness/AIDS (8%). Does this mean, that we can conclude, as does a 
recent paper, that ‘Malawians, like the critics of AIDS exceptionalism, would 
prefer fewer resources be allocated to AIDS and more to other critical day-to-
day problems’ (Dionne et al, 2009: 11)?  No. Respondents were not asked if the 
AIDS response should be scaled down. They were only asked about their 
priorities, and they may well have taken the current level of spending on AIDS 
as a given. At most, the data can be seen as indicating that at the margin, 
Malawians would prefer additional resources to be spent on providing safe 
water, food security etc. The data probably tell us more about the scale of other 
problems in Malawi than they tell us about whether ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ is 
spent on AIDS.  
 
Indeed, given that AIDS-related spending (from all sources) per HIV positive 
person in Malawi is the third lowest in Africa (Chad and Mozambique are the 
only countries with lower levels), it would be bizarre to conclude that ‘too 
much’ is spent on AIDS in Malawi. According to the most recent UNAIDS 
estimates, the average spending from all sources on AIDS per HIV positive 
person in Malawi was $60, less than a quarter of the average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (www.unaids.org) - see Table 3. Rather, the development challenge is to 
find additional development resources for the country rather than to cut the 





There are obviously many cultural obstacles to the rollout of HAART. These 
include rival conceptions of illness and healing, stigma, shame – all of which 
undermine both the demand for HAART and appropriate adherence to treatment 
regimens. This paper has not reviewed such obstacles.  Rather, it attempted to 
explore the relative importance of measurable cultural factors in shaping cross-
country HAART coverage. The paper found that donor funding was a crucial 
factor, and hence drew attention to the recent backlash against AIDS funding – 
arguing that it poses an important ‘external’ cultural threat to the HAART 
rollout. Despite claims to the contrary, the paper shows that although Africans 
face many problems, particularly pertaining to food security and poverty, health 
remains high on the agenda, especially in the hyper-epidemic countries of 
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